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The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature:
A Problem of Representation
by
MARIE ASHE*
Introduction
Among the challenges that face clinical law professors acquainting
students with various areas of practice is that of giving accounts to our
students of the reasons why we engage in particular kinds of representa-
tion and why we have chosen to serve the particular clients whom we
represent. Students are often keenly aware of their own reservations
about particular categories of clients well before they encounter, as stu-
dent-attorneys, any member of the class or classes they feel inclined to
exclude from their zealous advocacy. It is not unusual, for example, for
a clinician to discover that a student coming into a poverty law clinic has
reservations about representing tenants in housing cases, about represent-
ing debtors in bankruptcy cases, or about representing disability benefits
claimants. Sometimes students express their reservations by advancing
the proposition that the law in such areas unfairly "tilts" in favor of the
potential clients and that the public policies rationalizing the law are un-
sound. As often as not, however, students detect-or anticipate that they
will detect-moral deficiencies in the tenant, the debtor, the disability
claimant, or other kind of client. They imagine or expect that the client
may wrongly "take advantage" of the law, "misuse" the legal process
through dishonesty, or pursue a claim because of some unworthy motiva-
tion. And it is the student's perception of the client's moral deficiency
that supports the student's aversion to representing the client.
In the course of my practice and clinical teaching, the category of
clients that students and other practitioners seem most frequently reluc-
tant to represent are parents who, in child dependency cases, allegedly
have abused or neglected their children. The inclination to reject such
clients is almost invariably expressed in terms of a conviction or feeling
that such parents are morally abject. Students often speak of such par-
ents with apparent horror and revulsion. Because my practice and my
* Roscoe Pound Posten Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
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clinical teaching have involved extensive representation of parents-and
especially of mothers-in abuse and neglect proceedings, I have at-
tempted to identify writings that might introduce students to perspec-
tives that could facilitate a more sympathetic approach to these clients.
It seems to me that in this area, as in many areas of legal practice, the
limitations of our own experiences can be partially transcended by our
reference to literature.
In recent years, an increased awareness of the "law and literature"
movement has developed, and discussion of what literature may be able
to contribute to the practice of law has broadened. Many law schools
now offer "law and literature" courses. This Article proposes that clini-
cians should encourage in our students at the beginnings of their legal
practice the regular reading of literature and the broad consideration of
its relevance to the practice of law. Such reading should be incorporated
directly into the clinical curriculum as a means of raising students' and
our own consciousness of the complex realities of clients' lives and of the
contexts within which our clients' moral agencies are expressed in more
or less free fashion.
Some recent American fiction has clear relevance for practitioners
working in matters involving child abuse or neglect and can be helpful to
students and other practitioners exploring the moral significance of their
practices. In this Article I will focus particularly on one instance of such
fiction, Toni Morrison's novel, Beloved. 1 While Morrison's writing is by
no means the only instance of relevant fiction, I have chosen it as my
focus because it engages the figure of the "bad mother" in her most ex-
treme form, that of infanticide. Beloved describes the treatment of the
"murderous mother" by law and by a moral community challenged to
construct some adequate interpretation of her destructive act. It thus
engages directly with that which is problematic about the "bad mother."
I suggest that careful reading of Beloved can assist those of us engaged in
legal representation of "bad mothers" to new understandings of our cli-
ents and of our own work.
In Part I I offer an overview of the ways in which law and literature
have operated to define abusive mothers, making them the silenced ob-
jects of legal and literary narratives. In Part II I turn to Beloved, a text in
which I see the destructive or "bad" mother as the subject of narrative-
that is, as a figure speaking in her own voice or voices. I propose a read-
ing of the novel that considers its expression of the various understand-
ings of the "bad mother" character as they occur in her own self-
1. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED (1987).
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interpretation, in the treatment of her act of infanticide by the law, and
in the constructive interpretation of her act by the moral community that
she inhabited at the time it occurred and from which she came to be
excluded. In Part III I discuss emergent notions of narrative-as-theory,
cite instances of narratives relevant to the experiences of some "bad
mothers," and identify the reasons why I believe that fictive narrative
presently operates as the narrative form most capable of assaulting the
seemingly intransigent stereotype of the "bad mother." I identify, also,
some issues that I see as effectively raised for legal practitioners by Be-
loved and by other related works of fiction. In conclusion I urge an in-
creased incorporation into the clinical curriculum of literary texts
relevant to our areas of legal practice.
I. The "Bad Mother": Her Figure in Law and in Literature
The "bad" or "unfit" mother has been a powerful figure in both
Western law and Western literature, which identify the "bad mother" as
the woman whose neglectful, abusive, reckless, or even murderous behav-
iors threaten or destroy her children. Her image in ancient Greek litera-
ture occurs, for example, in the murderous figure of Sophocles' Medea; in
the maddened, murderous Agave, mother of Pentheus, in Euripides' The
Bacchae; and in the fatefully destructive Jocasta, mother of Oedipus. 2
The "bad mother" is a figure in the biblical account of Solomon's judg-
ment, which is often cited as a quintessential instance of wisdom and of
sound judgment. 3
In practice lawyers and student-attorneys consistently encounter the
"bad mother" image, which operates in "private" custody disputes that
arise between parents (or among other relatives) 4 as well as in "public"
matters in which the state intervenes to interrupt, either temporarily or
permanently, a woman's knowledge of and contact with her children.5
The image of the deficient, dangerous, and evil mother confronts lawyers
2. See THE COMPLETE GREEK TRAGEDIES (Rex Warner ed., 1955).
3. 1 Kings 3:16-28 (King James). For analysis of the construction of the "bad mother"
within and through Solomon's judgment, see Marie Ashe, Abortion of Narrative: A Reading of
the Judgment of Solomon, 4 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 81 (1992). See also Ann Althouse,
Beyond King Solomon's Harlots: Women in Evidence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1265 (1992).
4. For discussion of the operation of the image in "private" custody disputes, see PHYL-
LIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATrLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 66 (1986)
(reporting a study indicating that "good enough" mothers lost custody 70% of the time in
such contests).
5. The "public" matters, often referred to as "dependency proceedings," include pro-
ceedings in which a parent or other custodian who allegedly abused or neglected a child may
be temporarily deprived of the child's custody while custody is entrusted to a state agency that
arranges for placement of the child away from the parent. They also include "termination"
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in every area of law relating to children and their relationships with their
mothers. Its sources and its expressions have been discussed in anthro-
pological, psychological, and psychoanalytic theory, as well as in literary
theory. 6 Feminist theory has engaged directly with the stereotype, often
identifying it as a central impediment to the effort to overcome oppres-
sions of women.7
The task of identifying and attacking the stereotype in the prevalent
cultural consciousness and unconsciousness has been, and continues to
be, onerous. But the challenge of confronting the "bad mother" figure in
contexts where it is unquestionably clear that a mother has caused harm
to her children has been even more difficult. Feminist theory, with cer-
tain notable exceptions, has been far more silent than might have been
hoped in the face of such troubling realities. 8
It is, I believe, a common experience in abuse and neglect matters
that anxiety and ambivalence concerning the mother-child relationship
are experienced by lawyers, social workers, and judges-as well as by
clients. These deep feelings work to frustrate lawyers' efforts to re-pres-
ent, in full and various accounts, the realities of their clients who are
stereotypically represented as "bad mothers." Operating within the con-
sciousness or the unconsciousness of the individual lawyer, the "bad
mother" image may have immediate impact on the legal practitioner in a
number of ways. First, the image can lead the lawyer to exaggerate the
harmfulness of a mother/client's alleged behavior. The pervasiveness of
the gender based stereotype can frustrate the attorney-client relationship
matters involving more serious abuse or neglect that may provide the basis for permanent
removal of a child and cessation or termination of the "parental rights."
6. See NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1989) (dis-
cussing many of these roots of the "bad mother" figure).
7. Major writings discussing mothering and the "bad mother" include: JANE LAZARRE,
THE MOTHER KNOT (1976); MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY (Joyce Trebilcot
ed., 1983); ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTI-
TUTION (1976). For argument that the figure of the omnipotent and dangerous mother oper-
ates within feminist, as well as nonfeminist, discussions of mothering, see CHODOROW, supra
note 6, and especially Nancy J. Chodorow & Susan Contratto, The Fantasy of the Perfect
Mother, in FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY, supra note 6, at 79.
8. A notable exception may be found in RICH, supra note 7 (see especially chapter 10,
Violence: The Heart of Maternal Darkness, at 260-74). While feminist theory of the 1960s and
1970s tended to overlook treatment of motherhood, there has developed in the 1980s and
1990s a new focus on issues involving women as mothers. This focus, however, often has
tended to revalorize motherhood by emphasizing the nurturing features of mothers, and by
sometimes attributing superior morality to mothers by virtue of their purportedly greater ca-
pacities for nurturance. Unfortunately, the revalorization of motherhood by "cultural femi-
nists," influenced by the work of Carol Gilligan, often implicates "essentialistic" notions
concerning women. These notions can bolster destructive stereotypes or can divide women
among themselves by excluding some women from the scope of relevance of "feminist theory."
[Vol. 43
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itself, to the degree that the relationship is marked by the lawyer's own
acknowledged or unconscious ambivalences about motherhood. It will
do this by encouraging the lawyer's too-ready acceptance of the prosecu-
tor's characterization of a great variety of maternal behaviors as directly
harmful to a child.9 It will discourage the lawyer's critical inquiry into
whether in fact a child is being harmed at all and whether harm, if it is
occurring, should be seen as caused by the inadequacy of socioeconomic,
physical, and emotional supports for the mother.
The image also may interfere with the lawyer's recourse to prevail-
ing interpretations of "zealous advocacy" which emphasize that the at-
torney-client relationship must be "client-centered." It can lead the
lawyer to feel comfortable substituting his or her own judgment for the
client's judgment. This interference will occur to the degree that the ster-
eotype, through its moral devaluation of the client, leads or encourages
the lawyer to devalue the goals defined by the client and to regard them
as having lesser moral worth than goals defined by other kinds of clients.
The operation of the "bad mother" image in both these ways may tend,
further, to undermine the zeal of the advocate and to encourage the law-
yer's unconscious collusion in the silencing of the mother/client by the
law. It may discourage the full exercise of the lawyer's critical capacities
and the lawyer's ability to imagine effective defenses for the mother/
client.
These considerations suggest that the "bad mother" stereotype may
work to create an appearance of "badness" in mother/clients where in
fact such "badness" is not present. But what of cases in which the acts
alleged and likely to be proven do in fact strike the lawyer as unquestion-
ably "bad," that is, as clearly harmful or destructive to the children? If
the lawyer's self-definition depends, to any degree, on an identification
with the client's moral worthiness, how can the lawyer justify as in some
sense "good" the representation of clients nearly universally perceived as
very "bad"?
Rejecting the "hired gun" model of advocacy and believing that, as
lawyers, we cannot act in ways that we find morally satisfactory when we
do not perceive moral worth in our clients, 10 the remainder of this Arti-
9. Two works discussing this reality are CHESLER, supra note 4 at 64-89 (arguing that,
"[n]o mother can embody the maternal ideal perfectly enough to ensure her custody in a bat-
tle"), and JANE SWiGART, THE MYTH OF THE BAD MOTHER: THE EMOTIONAL REALITIES
OF MOTHERING 24-26 (1991) (arguing that "maternal impotence," the inability to provide for
the needs of children, arises as a consequence of a "culture that condones the manipulation
and exploitation of those close to you-even children").
10. Charles Fried's now classic consideration of the model of zealous advocate as "law-
yer/friend" explores the moral justification of the attorney-client relationship. Fried argues
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cle suggests that such moral worth does exist in "bad mothers," that it
has begun to be very effectively expressed in contemporary fictive narra-
tive, and that Toni Morrison's novel, Beloved, can be a major resource
for lawyers struggling to understand and to interpret our "bad mother"
clients.
II. The "Bad Mother" as the Subject of Narrative: Toni
Morrison's Beloved
Toni Morrison's novels have manifested a persistent preoccupation
with that which is problematic in women's relationships with their chil-
dren. Much of her writing involves complex female characters struggling
to inhabit or to escape maternal situations constructed and constrained
by the particularities of American culture at various historical periods.
While images of murderous or otherwise destructive mothers abound
throughout her writing," Morrison's Beloved may constitute the most
fully developed rendering of the "bad mother" in American fiction.
Set in the period immediately following the Civil War, Beloved gives
account of the murder by a runaway slave woman, Sethe, of her daugh-
ter, and tells, also, the physical and spiritual consequences of that murder
for Sethe and the moral communities that surround her. In stating the
moralizing or demoralized responses to Sethe's act by various moral
communities-including the law, white abolitionists, and other former
slaves-the novel inquires into the moral interpretations and imaginings
of people who have been variously victimized. It manifests the utter in-
adequacy of the "bad mother" stereotype in its treatment of Sethe as well
as in its treatment of the character Ella, who, herself implicated in the
death of her own young child, appears in the novel as a powerful voice of
moral agency. Indeed, the novel can be read as inquiring how the exper-
iences of victimization and oppression underlie what can properly be
called moral agency and ethics. Specifically, it demonstrates inquiry into
for the lawyer's "amoral ethical role" and purports to justify the lawyer's disregarding of the
interests of "abstract others" by valorizing the client's "autonomy" and the lawyer's commit-
ment to that value. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundation of the
Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). It is my belief that student-attorneys
and other practitioners working in the area of child dependency find that model inadequate for
the reason that they-and most people-are unable ever to fully experience the children in-
volved in such matters as "abstract others."
11. Examples are: the troubling rejection of the child Pecola by her mother Pauline, in
TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE (1970); the mother Eva's murder by fire of her adult son
Plum in TONI MORRISON, SULA (1973); the troubled relationship of Milkman and his mother
in TONI MORRISON, THE SONG OF SOLOMON (1977); and the lack of mothering of the charac-
ter Jardine in TONI MORRISON, TAR BABY (1981).
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certain realities of the "bad mother": who she is; what motivates her;
what are the consequences of her acts or omissions; what is the moral
value of her acts?
Beloved involves many fully imagined characters. Among these,
Sethe is most central, but her struggle is paralleled by that of other major
characters-Paul D, Denver, and Ella. Each character struggles to
achieve spiritual as well as physical survival and wellness, to escape
psychically, as well as physically, the brutalization and degradation that
have left them spiritually and emotionally enslaved in spite of their hav-
ing escaped from the institution of slavery. In its major theme-infanti-
cide-the novel raises with no sentimentality and in enormous
complexity the issue of the moral significance of an act of murder com-
mitted by a "bad" and apparently unrepentant mother.
In its scope, as well as in the quality of its language, Beloved is un-
questionably a major work of American fiction. To read it is to experi-
ence a singular kind of writing. The novel has been read and interpreted
variously by critics who have explored its location within traditions of
African-American and feminist literature specifically, and within Ameri-
can fiction in general.1 2 My focus in this discussion will be on Morrison's
treatment of the mythic image of the "bad mother."
To state the story told in Beloved as a chronology is already to mis-
represent it, for the story is told by Morrison through a circling and loop-
ing narrative that moves continuously from present to recent to remote
past and back again. While the opening chapter defines events that occur
in Cincinnati in 1873, well after the abolition of slavery and eighteen
years after Sethe's murder of her infant daughter, the novel's process in-
volves its characters' increasing and deepening rememberings. It moves
the reader into and through Sethe's and Paul D's recollections of their
earlier life experiences as slaves on a Kentucky farm called "Sweet
Home" and of their lives since their departures. It also carries the reader
into the more remote past through the reflections of the haunting and
haunted figure of the ghost of Sethe's murdered child, known throughout
as "Beloved."
When Paul D comes to Cincinnati in 1873 and rejoins Sethe, whom
he has not seen in the eighteen years since they were separated from one
another and from "Sweet Home," Sethe and Paul D together begin to
remember a past too painful for either of them to have remembered
12. Some notable treatments of Beloved can be found in: BARBARA HILL RIGNEY, THE
VOICES OF TONI MORRISON (1991); JUDITH WILT, ABORTION, CHOICE AND CONTEMPO-
RARY FICTION: THE ARMAGEDDON OF THE MATERNAL INSTINCT (1990); Susan Bowers,
Beloved and the New Apocalypse, J. ETHNIC STUD., Spr. 1990, at 59.
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alone. After having devoted herself to mind numbing routines, which
she has valued precisely because they assisted her "serious work of beat-
ing back the past"13 and her "keeping the past at bay,"'14 Sethe begins to
recall her history in Paul D's company, finding it for the first time "bear-
able" because "it was his as well-to tell, to refine and tell again."1 5 Be-
tween them, Sethe and Paul D engage in "trust and rememory,"' 16
recalling the histories of their individual lives and the lives of the other
members of the "Sweet Home" community. In the connection that they
begin to establish with one another, Sethe and Paul D begin to tell one
another their buried memories of events that had been entirely too de-
structive and painful to deal with except through forgetting. Morrison
expresses in the many-layered reflections of Sethe and Paul D, as well as
in the other characters, the complex meanings and implications of the
experiences recorded in the historical slave narratives that she examined
incident to her writing of the novel. Her familiarity with those narratives
permits Morrison's pondering, probing, and interrogating them in a
method that lays bare their fullest moral significance.
Sethe's memories include her early separation from her own mother,
who was not permitted to nurse her; her learning of her mother's exper-
iences of sexual assault; the knowledge of her mother's infanticides-kill-
ing babies she had borne as a consequence of sexual violence; the
understanding that her mother had chosen to keep Sethe and had named
her for her father; her remembrance of fragments of stories told in some
forgotten language by Nan, the slave woman who cared for her in her
own mother's stead; her recollection of the marking of a cross and a
circle burned into her mother's flesh; and her memory of her mother's
dead body cut down from the tree on which she had been hanged.
Sethe's memories also include her arrival at age fourteen at the Ken-
tucky farm. At "Sweet Home" Sethe met with kindliness from the other
slaves who lived on the farm. The young men who worked as farm
hands honored Sethe's autonomy and dignity while they awaited her
choice of one of them as her mate. Within a context in which family ties
of slaves were ordinarily violated with ruthlessness, Sethe chose Halle to
become her husband. Although aware of her own mother's separation
from her, and of her mother-in-law's forcible separation from the first
seven of her eight children, Sethe gave birth at "Sweet Home" to three
children and defined her identity in terms of her mothering of them.
13. MORRISON, BELOVED, supra note 1, at 73.
14. Id. at 43.
15. Id. at 99.
16. Id.
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Life at "Sweet Home" changed when its relatively moderate master
died and was replaced by one known to the slaves-because of his habits
of measuring and recording-as "Schoolteacher." The new master's
habits evidenced his perception of the slaves as a nonhuman species, and
the cruelty of his treatment of them mirrored his "scientific" perceptions.
This changed reality led the slaves to attempt a mass escape. Sethe suc-
cessfully smuggled her three children across the Ohio River to safety
with her mother-in-law, who had been freed when her son Halle had
performed extra labor as the price of her freedom. Before accomplishing
her own escape, however, Sethe, in an advanced state of pregnancy, ex-
perienced a brutal sexual assault perpetrated by Schoolteacher's neph-
ews. She reached the security of her mother-in-law's home only after an
extraordinary journey across the Ohio River, during which she gave
birth to her youngest daughter, whom she named Denver in honor of the
young, poor, white woman who assisted her in the birthing. The male
slaves, including Halle and Paul D, were unsuccessful in their escape
attempts and were murdered, tortured, or scattered from one another.
Reunited with her mother-in-law, Baby Suggs, in Cincinnati, Sethe
cared for her four children, lavishing upon them all the sweetnesses of
"good" mothering. Herself cared for by Baby Suggs, who bathed, band-
aged and comforted her, Sethe greeted her children with delight and
love. She lavished kisses on her sons. "She kept kissing them. She kissed
the backs of their necks, the tops of their heads and the centers of their
palms .... ,,17 She filled both her daughters with the sweetness of
mother-milk.
This time of grace-lacking only because Sethe was uncertain of the
whereabouts and fate of her husband and her other "Sweet Home'
friends-lasted for twenty-eight days, but was terminated by the arrival
at Baby Suggs' home of Schoolteacher, who had come to reclaim Sethe
and her children as fugitive slaves. Seeing the slavemaster approaching
and recalling her own brutalization, Sethe gathered up her children and
fled to the woodshed. There, with a handsaw, she cut the throat of her
older daughter, killing her, and attempted to kill her other children.
Observing Sethe's apparently deranged condition, Schoolteacher de-
clined to take her into his custody. Covered with the "red baby blood"
of her older daughter and nursing her youngest child, Denver, Sethe was
arrested and charged with murdering her child. She was represented by
a white abolitionist lawyer named Bodwin, who spoke to the judge in
chambers and "managed to turn infanticide and the cry of savagery
17. Id. at 93.
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around, and build a further case for abolishing slavery."18 Sethe spent
three months in jail and was then released. She returned, with her baby
daughter, Denver, to the home in which her mother-in-law had contin-
ued to care for the two young sons.
Sethe found Baby Suggs utterly demoralized by the horror of Sethe's
act and in despair at the cruelty that had provoked it. Convinced that
"there was no grace,"19 Baby Suggs gave up all hope. "Her faith, her
imagination and her great big old heart began to collapse ... ."20 She
took to bed for several years and died in the keeping-room of her house.
After her mother-in-law's death, Sethe stayed on in the house, living
estranged from the rest of the community, which repudiated her for her
"pride" and for her failure to acknowledge her murderous act as "evil."
Indeed, Sethe consistently characterized the murder as "good"-as an
act of love-for the daughter on whose tombstone she had had engraved
(paying for the engraving by submitting to an act of sexual violence) the
single word: "Beloved."
Within her own house Sethe attempted to create a moral community
among herself and her living children, a community able to support her
naming of the murder of Beloved as "good." Outside the house, the
larger moral community of other former slaves, guided largely by Ella,
the woman who had greeted Sethe and her newborn child upon their
crossing of the Ohio, repudiated Sethe, naming her act as "bad." Sethe's
family-community lived disturbed by the visitations and troubling haunt-
ings of Beloved's ghost, which frequently manifested itself in pools of
blood-red light, in overturned slop jars, or in gusts of sour air. That
community was reduced by the flight of Sethe's two sons, each of whom
left home upon reaching adolescence.
At the time of the novel's opening chapter in 1873, Sethe lives alone
with her youngest child, Denver, who has severed all connection with the
community because of her complex feelings of shame about her mother's
extreme act. Shortly after Paul D's arrival at Sethe's house, he, Sethe,
and Denver begin to be confronted by the in-the-flesh appearance of Be-
loved. Sethe's murdered daughter appears as a young woman of the age
she would have been had she lived. Without stating with clarity where
she has come from, Beloved takes up residence in Sethe's home, requiring
Sethe, Denver, and Paul D each to recall the reality of her murder-an
act that she has not forgiven and will not forgive-as well as of their own
past and present sufferings.
18. Id. at 260.
19. Id. at 89.
20. Id.
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Paul D's encounter with the reality of the murder leads to his con-
demnation of Sethe. While he has been able to do certain remembering
in her company, he proves unable to sustain her in remembering her
murder of Beloved. He is similarly unable to understand the gravity of
the sexual assault she has experienced. Paul D shatters the beginning of
the new community that he and Sethe had begun by his condemnation of
her "too thick love" of her children, by his definition of Beloved's mur-
der as an other-than-human act, and by his assertion of moral superiority
manifested in his separation from Sethe.
When Paul D leaves Sethe's house, Beloved is further empowered.
She rejects and overcomes Sethe's explanations and excuses concerning
the murder and begins to consume and devour her mother. Beloved in-
creases in size as Sethe diminishes and wanes. At this juncture, Denver
determines, on her own behalf and for her mother's survival, to seek the
assistance of the larger community of black women, occasioning a con-
frontation of the two moral communities.
Interestingly, this confrontation engages two "bad mothers," for the
leader of the group of women who go to Sethe's house to exorcise Be-
loved is Ella, who had herself rejected and permitted her child to die, a
child to whom she had given birth as the consequence of sexual assault.
Ella's determination to reverse her repudiation of Sethe and to attempt
the freeing of Sethe from her spiritual and physical enslavement by Be-
loved's ghost, is motivated by the recognition of her likeness to Sethe and
her perception that their likeness outweighs their differences.
What distinguishes Ella from Sethe is Ella's having never forgotten
the almost unthinkable sexual violence she had experienced over the
course of a year in which she had been kept in captivity. 21 Her refusal to
forget and her recollection of the child whom she had delivered "but
would not nurse, a hairy white thing,"' 22 had enabled Ella's strength and
spiritual health, and allowed her to lead the community of women to
Sethe's house where they were able, by a magically powerful ululation, to
free Sethe from her haunting by Beloved.
Listening to the women's voices, in a wave of sound, Sethe perceives
the arrival of the white abolitionist, Bodwin, who is both the owner of
her house and the lawyer who had defended her. Bodwin's arrival re-
vives in Sethe her memory of Schoolteacher's arrival eighteen years
before. Bodwin-the-abolitionist is portrayed as deeply implicated in ra-
cism, as a person who hated slaves although he "hated slavery worse,"'23
21. Id. at 119.
22. Id at 258.
23. Id at 137.
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and as, perhaps, a model of white liberal law. Upon seeing Bodwin,
Sethe, while caught in a kind of posttraumatic flashback, does not at-
tempt to kill her child in repetition of her actions eighteen years earlier.
Rather, she attempts an attack upon Bodwin, the model of the oppressive
legal order that even in its more benign manifestations perpetuates op-
pression. Psychically liberated by the sustaining community of the black
women led by Ella, Sethe directs her rage and anger outward rather than
against herself through her child.
Her release from the haunting by Beloved, however, does not leave
Sethe spiritually whole. She takes to bed-repeating the desperate and
demoralized turn that had been taken earlier by her mother-in-law. Her
previous moral structures shattered by Beloved's coming and going,
Sethe slips into a deathly resignation, mourning the loss of Beloved as the
loss of her "best thing." She is summoned out of that hopelessness only
by the ministrations of her youngest daughter, Denver, and by a new
connection with her lover.
Paul D has accomplished some healing of his own through his con-
frontation with the memory of Sethe's infanticidal act. That healing ena-
bled his turning away from his earlier utter rejection of Sethe as morally
contemptible for committing that act. Paul D becomes able to return to
Sethe and to begin the reconstruction with her of both their lives. "He
wants to put his story next to hers."' 24 Paul D is able, through his new
connection with Sethe and through his commitment to forming a moral
community that will include her and the larger group, to summon Sethe
to a recognition that she is in herself a source of goodness, that this "bad
mother" is, indeed, her own "best thing."
Beloved constitutes a powerful refiguring of the "bad mother" im-
age. In this novel, at least two women who might in other contexts be
reduced to stereotypical "bad mothers"-because of their extreme, reck-
less, or murderous acts-come to express voices of moral agency. Morri-
son requires our serious consideration of Sethe's claim that her
murderous act was a good act, an act of love, and of Ella's apparently
guiltless survival of her own experiences of victimization and of destruc-
tion. Beloved offers no simple ethic, no single moral, reducible to a gen-
eral principle or rule. What it does offer is an insistence and a strongly
persuasive account of the complexities of certain maternal experiences
out of which apparent "bad mothers" may emerge and act. It works to
raise complex and compelling questions which make it impossible to
classify a stereotypical "bad mother" as a person unworthy of serious
24. Id. at 173.
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consideration or, when she appears in the context of legal proceedings, as
a client undeserving of our representation and advocacy.
Morrison's novel is not alone in exploring this new theme. Writings
of Marge Piercy,2 5 Mary Gordon,2 6 and Sue Miller27 come readily to
mind as other powerfully engaging novels in which law students and
other practitioners can find new figurings of the "bad mother." The spe-
cific issues that writings like Beloved raise for legal theory, and the ways
in which the raising of these issues can facilitate the work of "good law-
yers" for "bad mothers," are useful to consider.
MI. The "Bad Mother" in Fictive Narrative and in Legal
Theory
Among the major projects of postmodernist criticism has been a
new examination of the relationships that may exist between writing that
has traditionally been called "narrative" and that which has traditionally
been identified as "theoretical." This issue has been explored by many
writers and has recently emerged as a consideration for writers exploring
jurisprudential questions. Some commentators of the "law and litera-
ture" movement have argued that the usefulness of literary narratives to
law and to legal theory is limited.28 That argument, however, depends
upon an unsophisticated or nostalgic notion of what "theory" can pre-
sume to be and to accomplish in the present period of broad awareness of
multicultural realities and visions. Contemporary expressions of "philos-
ophy" in the United States and Europe have articulated perceptions of
the power and significance of narrative in the present time. Within such
expressions, the old foundations upon which "theory" relied appear to
have vanished.
Much major antifoundationalist critical work has occurred in the
contributions of French writers such as Michel Foucault,29 Jacques Der-
rida,30 and Julia Kristeva,31 each of whom has begun to be seriously con-
25. MARGE PIERCY, WOMAN ON THE EDGE OF TIME (1976).
26. MARY GORDON, MEN AND ANGELS (1985).
27. SUE MILLER, THE GOOD MOTHER (1986).
28. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 353 (1988).
29. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES (1970); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin
Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
30. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976); JACQUES
DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1978). For a powerful statement of
the implications of deconstruction for "the possibility of justice," see Jacques Derrida, Force of
Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 920 (1990).
31. JULIA KRISTEVA, DESIRE IN LANGUAGE: A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO LITERATURE
AND ART (Leon S. Roudiez ed. & Thomas Gora et al. trans., 1980); JULIA KRISTEVA, POW-
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sidered by legal scholars in the United States. Each of these writers has
explicitly-often by "style" as well as by "substance," to the degree that
those can be differentiated-valorized narrative. These French
postmodernists have demonstrated the present impossibility of "grand
theory," and their demonstrations have opened up space for new narra-
tives. Foucault, Derrida, and Kristeva-among others-have contrib-
uted to the development of smaller narratives. 32
While the profoundly critical perspectives of Foucault, Derrida, and
Kristeva have worked to deconstruct foundations, they have seemed, to
some readers, to invite a stasis in moral relativism to the degree that they
have failed to propose and justify criteria by which various "little narra-
tives" might be evaluated. 33
The more recent writing of Jean-Francois Lyotard34 and, in the
United States, the accessible writing of Richard Rorty,35 explicitly ad-
dress the question of relativism in ways that further valorize narrative,
including fictive narrative. A consideration of what they can tell us is
useful for an evaluation of the contribution that writing such as Toni
Morrison's can make to moral-and, thereby, to legal-theory. It also
sheds light on why narrative, and especially literary narrative, is of par-
ticular importance to displacement of the "bad mother" stereotype in
ways that can be sustaining for lawyers representing such women.
Among American philosophers, Richard Rorty is perhaps the writer
whose work has most fully engaged with the antifoundationalist themes
of postmodernist European thinkers. Apparent throughout Rorty's work
is a high valuation of "little narratives," as opposed to metanarrative or
grand theory. Rorty writes of the need for "narratives of increasing cos-
mopolitanism, '36 by which he means narratives that are "ever more in-
ERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION (Leon S. Roudiez trans., 1982). For discussion of
the implications of Kristeva's early work for feminist theory in general and feminist jurispru-
dence in particular, see Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Post-Structuralist Feminist
Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129, 1163 (1987).
32. Such "smaller narratives" include, notably: JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POST CARD
(Alan Bass trans., 1987); I, PIERRE RIVIERE, HAVING SLAUGHTERED MY MOTHER, MY SIs-
TER AND MY BROTHER (Michel Foucault ed. & Frank Jellinek trans., 1975); Julia Kristeva,
Stabat Mater, in THE KRISTEVA READER 160-86 (Toril Moi ed., 1986).
33. See DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES (1991).
34. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE (Georges Van
Den Abbeele trans., 1988) [hereinafter, LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND]; JEAN-FRANCOIS LY-
OTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington &
Brian Massumi trans., 1984); JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD & JEAN LOUP THEBAUD, JUST
GAMING (Wlad Godzich trans., 1985).
35. RICHARD RoRTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1979); RICHARD
RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH (1991).
36. RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH, supra note 35, at 213.
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clusive."37 The task of achieving such narratives, Rorty suggests, lies in
the work of narrators whom he characterizes as "agents of love" and
"connoisseurs of diversity. 38 The work of moral progress, he urges, will
derive from the contributions of "historians, novelists, ethnographers,
and muckraking journalists, for example,"' 39 rather than from the writ-
ings of theologians or philosophers. Such writers will facilitate the
"gradual expansion of the imagination of those in power, their gradual
willingness to use the term 'we' to include more and more different sorts
of people." 40 Thus, Rorty's work suggests the strong value that litera-
ture can have for moral development.
Rorty is not alone among major American philosophers in propos-
ing such value for literature. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum has consid-
ered the relationship between literature and moral philosophy and has
proposed a conception of ethical understanding that will be most appro-
priately expressed and stated in "certain forms usually considered liter-
ary rather than philosophical. '41 Nussbaum argues that the conception
of moral philosophy must be broadened to include such literary texts.
Both Rorty's and Nussbaum's work support the proposition that narra-
tives, including literary narratives, deserve to be explored as references
for moral philosophers and ethicists.
A serious consideration of narrative has become apparent in legal
theory as well as in philosophy. In recent years, narrative has been par-
ticularly important within feminist critical jurisprudence42 and critical
race theory.43 The lawyer representing a "bad mother" is, however, un-
likely to find significant support in the narratives articulated within or
invoked by such theory. Legal theory, including feminist legal theory,
has thus far appeared to avoid the contextualizing narratives of "bad
mothering" that have begun to emerge within other disciplines. Indeed,
recent instances of legal theory focusing on client narratives have mani-
fested some tendency to support the stereotypical "good mother" figure.
An example of how feminist legal theory has thus far avoided bad
mothering narratives developed in other disciplines is its having largely
37. Id. at 219.
38. Id. at 206.
39. Id. at 207.
40. Id.
41. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY AND
LITERATURE at ix (1990).
42. For discussion of this trend, see Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79
CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991).
43. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A
LAW PROFESSOR (1991).
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ignored Linda Gordon's study of child abuse and other family violence.44
In this study of the practice, the prevalence, and the possible sources of
family violence, Gordon depends upon narratives recorded within social
workers' "case histories" to present richly textured accounts of the lives
of "bad mothers" (as well as of abusive fathers, husbands, and other fam-
ily members). It may be that certain attributes of Gordon's work-her
refusal to oversimplify, her constant emphasis of the ambivalences and
conflicting impulses that may give rise to child abuse, and her refusal to
reduce the analysis of child abuse to produce a simple moral vision-
render her work difficult for assimilation by theory that is less than pro-
foundly critical.45
Quite recently, a focus on client narrative has developed within legal
theory. This focus has provided a very valuable critique of lawyer prac-
tices that work to silence or disable clients.46 Theory incorporating client
narratives can operate powerfully to encourage lawyers' self-criticisms,
awareness of our own identities and of our own professional roles. It
typically has operated this way by juxtaposing two narratives: the first
being one that the lawyer--constrained by real or imagined doctrinal or
role limitations-would likely offer concerning the client; the second be-
ing the self-account actually given to a tribunal by the client in ways that
violate the constraints that the lawyer would have honored.
While legal theory incorporating client narrative can be supportive
of greater self-consciousness in the lawyer, and while it can sustain criti-
cal appreciation of the law, it is notable that some of the most striking
instances of such legal theory have featured rather traditional images of
"good mothers" and that none has focused on a more disturbing "bad
mother." On the contrary, the "client-narrative" development in legal
theory has featured the telling of appealing and sympathetic stories by
"good mothers." 47 Such work has enriched theory by its insistence that
we not permit the complexity of clients' lives to be erased by our own
44. LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIvES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988).
45. Martha Mahoney has proposed this possibility. Telephone Interview with Martha
Mahoney, Associate Professor, University of Miami Law School (Nov. 1991).
46. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons
of Client Narratives, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (analyzing how lawyers' interpretive practices
harm clients and proposing a commitment to client narratives); Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L.
REv. 1 (1990) (focusing on the ways in which gender, race, and class subordination suppress
clients' stories).
47. Alfieri, supra note 46, at 2109-10 (featuring a nurturant foster mother seeking food
stamps for her foster children); White, supra note 46, at 21-32 (featuring a proud black North
Carolinian mother buying "Sunday shoes" to maintain her children's dignity).
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collusion, as practitioners, with silencing tendencies that operate within
legal practice. However, such theory has not demonstrated that self-nar-
ratives can undo deeply rooted stereotypes that arise out of the appar-
ently universal experience of ambivalence about motherhood.
Like other legal theory, "client-narrative" accounts do not demon-
strate the possibility of persuasive self-narrative by "bad mothers." In-
deed, such theory does not reach the question of whether such narrative
could occur nor whether it could enable the lawyer's self-interpretation
as a "good lawyer" while engaged in serving persons nearly universally
perceived as "bad."
So, while Rorty proposes the value of narrative for developing ethi-
cal theory, there has been a notable lack of writing on the "bad mother"
able to sustain practitioners representing abusive women. Some of the
reasons for this omission may be suggested by reference to a notion of
Jean-Francois Lyotard, a writer who resembles Rorty in his rejection of
metanarrative possibilities and in his advocacy of "little narratives," but
who is far less sanguine and hopeful than Rorty about the possibility of
including within "our" moral universe all those who have legitimate
claims.
Considering what appear to be limits of cultural inclusiveness, Ly-
otard, by use of an analogy that will resonate for lawyers, has distin-
guished between the term litige, translated as "litigation," and the term
differend, for which there is no precise translation into English.48 "Liti-
gation," Lyotard proposes, is a term that applies to the case in which the
contesting parties are in agreement concerning how the issues should be
stated and what criteria should be applied to resolve them. In contrast, a
differend is the case in which "a plaintiff is divested of the means to argue
and becomes for that reason a victim." 49
Lyotard defines the ethical task as that of "bear[ing] witness to the
differend"50-that is, of producing narratives that, in paradoxical fash-
ion, utter what is unutterable. Lyotard identifies Auschwitz as a model
of the "differend"-the model of silenced victimization, "a damage ac-
companied by the loss of the means to prove the damage. ' 51 The reality
of Auschwitz, the suffering of the Holocaust victims, is such that at one
and the same time there exists an impossibility of representing it and an
ethical necessity that it be represented.
48. See generally LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND, supra note 34.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at xii (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 5.
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Lyotard's model of Auschwitz carries us back to a consideration of
Beloved. The project undertaken by Toni Morrison in Beloved is pre-
cisely what Lyotard prescribes as the ethical imperative: bearing witness
to the differend. Beloved accomplishes two particular kinds of bearing
witness: a bearing witness concerning the realities of slavery; and a bear-
ing witness concerning the myth of the "bad mother."
The relationship of Morrison's work to narratives of the Holocaust
is strongly suggested by the inscription on the dedication page of her
book: "Sixty Million and more." These words remind the reader of the
"six million" Jews murdered in the Holocaust, even while they refer di-
rectly to the "sixty million" slaves who lost their lives as a result of slav-
ery.5 2 Morrison's work of breaking silence and remembering the stories
of slavery has itself depended upon other narratives. Morrison has relied
heavily upon black histories and slave narratives. In Beloved, she writes
with authority, clarity, and detail, as a "specialist in particularity,"5 3 giv-
ing an account of the horrors of slavery that, precisely because of the
language possibilities available in fictive narrative, is more nearly able to
do justice to those realities than are historical narratives alone. Like re-
cent narratives of Holocaust victims,54 testimonies given by people who
spent time in Auschwitz and other labor camps and were eventually re-
leased, Morrison's work refuses to consider the event of "emancipation"
or "liberation" as marking the end of suffering. Morrison appreciates
and gives account of the ways in which the sufferings of slavery have
persisted and will persist until they are adequately remembered.
Within and in addition to her narrative of slavery and of postslavery
trauma, Morrison represents in Beloved a narrative that reclaims the
"bad mother" as one of "us," and she does so in a way that exceeds all
the tellings of the "bad mother" with which I am familiar. She does this
by telling a story "cruel enough to stop the blood."551 Morrison achieves
in Beloved a bearing witness to the differend in which the "bad mother"
is a silenced, victimized party. The achievement of having given voice to
Sethe, of having made the "bad mother" speak in words that we can
hear, is a singular one.
Discussing Morrison's writing prior to the publication of Beloved,
and focusing especially on her novel Sula,56 Marianne Hirsch has ob-
52. See Bowers, supra note 12, at 61 (citing Bonnie Angelo, The Pain of Being Black,
TIME, May 22, 1989, at 120).
53. RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH, supra note 35, at 207.
54. See, e.g., LAWRENCE L. LANGER, HOLOCAUST TESTIMONIES (1991).
55. ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS 233 (1983).
56. MORRISON, SULA, supra note 11.
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served that in the earlier novels the discourse of the "bad mother" is not
always able to be voiced at all. She notes that when it is able to be articu-
lated, it is always "repetitive, literal, hopelessly representational. It is
rooted in the body that shivers, hurts, bleeds, suffers, bums, rather than
in the eyes, or in the voice, which can utter its cries of pain."
'57
Hirsch echoes a theme perhaps first expressed in a major American
feminist work by Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born,58 emphasizing the
critical importance of incorporating "bad mother" discourse into femi-
nist theory:
Maternal knowledge... if it could be voiced, could enlarge a feminist
analysis and reverse traditional conceptions of love and anger, of
power and knowledge, of self in relation to other, of femininity and
maturity, of sexuality and nurturance.... [I]f feminists want to "stop
the blood" flowing from one generation to the next, we need to find
ways of hearing and telling the stories of mothers-to politicize moth-
erhood from within feminism.. .. 59
Such an accomplishment requires bringing into the discourse what has
not yet been said, making the bad mother the subject rather than the
object of narrative, or, in Lyotard's terms, bearing witness to a particular
differend.
Hirsch writes compellingly of the crucial importance for ethical the-
ory of incorporating "maternal narratives." She argues, in terms that
will be relevant to legal practitioners, concerning the specific and general
consequences that a breaking of the silence of "bad mothers" might
effectuate:
Further consistent exploration of maternal discourse-whether in
theoretical, fictional, or autobiographical writing-would reveal, I be-
lieve, notions of identity and subjectivity that correspond neither to the
unified ego of ego-psychology, nor to the fluid boundaries of object-
relations theory, nor to a subjectivity split against itself, as outlined by
Lacanian psychoanalysis. What model or definition of subjectivity
might be derived from a theory that begins with mothers rather than
with children? Can we conceive of development as other than a pro-
cess of separation from a neutral, either nurturing or hostile, but ulti-
mately self-effacing "holding" background? I would suggest that if we
start our study of the subject with mothers rather than with children, a
different conception of subjectivity might emerge. Although it might
be difficult to define, we might try to envision a culturally variable
form of interconnection between one body and another, one person
57. Marianne Hirsch, Maternal Narratives: "Cruel Enough to Stop the Blood," in READ-
ING BLACK: READING FEMINIsT 415, 426 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1990).
58. RICH, supra note 7.
59. Hirsch, supra note 57, at 427.
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and another, existing as social and legal as well as psychological
subjects. 6°
While Hirsch clearly defines the importance of the task of reaching
and uttering maternal narratives, recent writing by psychologist Dana
Crowley Jack demonstrates the difficulty of bringing into speaking sub-
jecthood persons or figures which have been excluded. Jack, in Silencing
the Self 61 presents a study of depressed women. While she discerns in
their lives patterns that make their depressions comprehensible and pre-
dictable consequences of having committed their energies to self-abnega-
tion in the hope of attaining intimacy, Jack is struck by the degree to
which these women's understandings of themselves are structured by
prevailing psychological concepts that reflect a high valuation of individ-
ualism and autonomy and a low valuation of intimacy and connection.
The prevailing discourse surrounding the notion of "selfhood" demands
that the women giving self-narratives present themselves and their de-
pressed conditions in negative terms. There is a sense in which Jack's
work could be seen as a case study demonstrating the reality of the differ-
end as it implicates gendered experiences of self.
The limitations of self-narrative possibilities for Jack's depressed
women pale in comparison to the barriers to self-narrations that might
give us access to the moral sensibilities and experiences of "bad
mothers." And it is perhaps for this reason that Beloved is so remarkable
in its "bad mother" account. Sethe truly embodies the bad mother as
speaking subject. And her speaking, much of which is speech to the
ghost of her murdered child and all of which is profoundly meditative
and reflective, is speech that would be largely unintelligible to law.
Sethe's search for self-definition, her necessary reflection and medi-
tation on her murderous act, discloses the moral nature of that act as far
more complex than could be assimilated to, or even suggested by, any
analysis that characterized it simply-whether as "good," as "evil," or as
"insane." Beloved reminds us that there is no "last word" by which we
can dismiss the "bad mother"-whether that word be "unfit," "evil,"
"unnatural," or "insane." Neither the standard formulations of the law
nor our own culturally induced resistances constitute a moral response
that does justice to her reality and her conditions.
Beloved is an account that does justice to affect by refusing to reduce
feeling to cognition. In achieving this, it achieves a most extraordinary
breaking of silence by and surrounding the "bad mother" figure. In let-
ting the "bad mother" speak, Beloved reminds us that when we hear her
60. Id. at 427-28.
61. DANA CROWLEY JACK, SILENCING THE SELF: WOMEN AND DEPRESSION (1991).
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we are required to pass from the comfort of easy judgment to the area of
demanding ethical commitment. Beloved reminds us that the "bad
mother" is a person whom we need to know, and that the opportunity to
know her-and to represent her-is an opportunity to know ourselves.
Conclusion
While a turn toward narrative within many disciplines has been ap-
parent in recent years, as well as development of notions of narrative-as-
theory, it is in literary-fictive-narrative that we have, at the present
time, the most adequate access to the experiences of "bad mothers."
Toni Morrison's Beloved is a powerful instance of theory-in-narrative in
its account of the subjectivities of some "bad mothers." It is a remarka-
ble instance of the significance of literature as a source of theory for prac-
titioners. Legal education would be improved by the incorporation of
reading literature as a method of expanding students' understandings of
clients often experienced as highly problematic.

